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In an influential 1995 law review article, Kent Greenawalt crafted the
image of "Shards of Lemon"I to illustrate the deep divisions that had
emerged among Supreme Court Justices over the landmark 1971 Estab-
lishment Clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 As Greenawalt observed, alt-
hough the Court did not formally disavow or overrule Lemon, the Justices
differed sharply over the viability, interpretation, and application of each of
the three prongs of the Lemon test.3 Greenawalt's imagery and analysis
continue to provide a helpful framework for an updated assessment of the
status and future of the Establishment Clause. The Justices remain deeply
divided in their approaches to the Lemon test and, more broadly, to the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. This Article suggests that, although a
number of factors have contributed to the splintering of the Court in its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one of the key issues of contention has
revolved around attitudes toward the perspectives of religious minorities
and nonbelievers.
Indeed, questions about the significance of the perspectives of reli-
gious minorities have played a central role in the modem development of
the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence. Many of the leading
Supreme Court cases addressing the Free Exercise Clause in the second
half of the twentieth century involved the claims of religious minorities. 4
These cases included important free exercise challenges by the Amish,
Muslims, Native Americans, Orthodox Jews, and Santeros, among others. 5
Yet, as a number of commentators have observed, the Supreme
Court's record in adjudicating the free exercise claims of religious minori-
ties-in particular, unfamiliar and unpopular religious minorities-is vul-
1. Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Claus-
es, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 323, 359 (1996).
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 361-69.
4. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q.
919 (2004); Amy Bowers & Kristen A. Carpenter, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association: Challenging the Narrative of Conquest, in INDIAN LAW STORIES (Carole Goldberg, Kevin
Washburn, and Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 2010); Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minori-
ties and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222
(2003); Samuel J. Levine, The Challenges of Religious Neutrality, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 535 (1999)
(reviewing FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (1995)); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious
Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Though a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 153 (1996) (hereinafter Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice]; Christopher C.
Lund, The New Victims of the Old Anti-Catholicism, CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract= 1943646 (last visited Mar. 24, 2012); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and
The Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998).
5. See Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice, supra note 4 passim.
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nerable to the critique that the Court's rhetoric and, at times, the Court's
holdings demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to look beyond majori-
tarian religious perspectives. 6 A brief survey of cases in which the Supreme
Court evaluated-and often rejected-the free exercise claims of various
religious minorities suggests that, in addition to its doctrinal analysis, the
Court's rhetoric has been disappointing in its lack of sensitivity to the per-
spectives of religious minorities.7 Indeed, all too often it has been left to the
Court's dissenters to recognize that proper adjudication of free exercise
rights entails an appreciation for religious minority perspectives.8
Building on these observations, this Article applies a similar analysis
to the Court's adjudication of Establishment Clause cases. At the same
time, the Article suggests that, in some ways, the Establishment Clause
calls for a more careful and complex consideration of religious perspec-
6. See sources cited supra note 4.
7. See Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice, supra note 4 passim.
8. To cite just a few examples of this phenomenon:
In 1944, in Prince v. Massachusetts, one of a long line of cases involving the claims of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Justice Murphy concluded his dissenting opinion with an eloquent and urgent call for protec-
tion of the rights of religious minorities:
From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man has known no limits in its ability
to forge weapons of oppression for use against those who dare to express or practice unortho-
dox religious beliefs. And the Jehovah's Witnesses are living proof of the fact that even in
this nation . .. the right to practice religion in unconventional ways is still far from secure.
Theirs is a militant and unpopular faith, pursued with a fanatical zeal. They have suffered bru-
tal beatings; their property has been destroyed; they have been harassed at every turn by the
resurrection and enforcement of little used ordinances and statutes. To them, along with other
present-day religious minorities, befalls the burden of testing our devotion to the ideals and
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom.
321 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In the 1986 case Goldman v. Weinberger, involving the military's denial of the right of an Orthodox
Jewish serviceman to wear a yarmulke while in uniform, Justice Brennan observed in dissent:
Definitions of necessity are influenced by decisionmakers' experiences and values. As a con-
sequence, in pluralistic societies such as ours, institutions dominated by a majority are inevi-
tably, if inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and values of minorities when these needs and
values differ from those of the majority .... A critical function of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment is to protect the rights of members of minority religions against quiet ero-
sion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unim-
portant, because unfamiliar. It is the constitutional role of this Court to ensure that this
purpose of the First Amendment be realized.
475 U.S. 503, 523-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Finally, regarding the Native American claims in the landmark 1990 case of Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, in a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor em-
phasized that:
[T]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious
practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our
free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on un-
popular or emerging religious groups.
494 U.S. 872, 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In dissent, Justice Blackmun added: "[T]his Court must scrupulously apply its free exercise analysis to
the religious claims of Native Americans, however unorthodox they may be." Id. at 921 (Blackmun, L,
dissenting).
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tives. After all, to properly assess the meaning and effect of the govern-
ment's accommodation or endorsement of religious practices or symbols, a
court has to look not only beyond majoritarian religious perspectives, but
also beyond the perspectives of those religious adherents-including, at
times, religious minorities-who support the government's involvement in
a particular religious practice or symbol. Just as majoritarian perspectives
may fail to take into account the effect of majoritarian attitudes and prac-
tices on religious minorities, minority perspectives may fail to appreciate
the meaning of minority expressions of religion for those with different
religious perspectives.
Moreover, the growing religious diversity in American society, ac-
companied by increasing numbers of self-identified secularists or nonbe-
lievers, adds another level of complexity to an Establishment Clause
analysis. 9 Though relevant to free exercise adjudication as well, these
changes in society likely have a more profound impact on Establishment
Clause cases. Courts have to determine whether, and to what extent, the
adjudication of an Establishment Clause challenge requires a consideration
of the perspectives of all of the various religious traditions represented in
American society, as well as those of secularists or atheists. Thus, while
free exercise cases involve the interests of two parties-the religious ad-
herent, claiming the right to exercise religion, and the government, claim-
ing the authority to restrict that right-one of the challenges in
Establishment Clause cases involves threshold questions of whose interests
are to be considered and protected.
In exploring these questions, this Article traces the Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence through several decades, examining a number of
landmark cases through the prism of religious minority perspectives. In so
doing, the Article aims to demonstrate the significance of religious perspec-
tives in the development of both the doctrine and rhetoric of the Establish-
ment Clause.10 The Article then turns to the current state of the
9. Cf Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking Founda-
tions ofAmerican Religious Liberty, 32 CARDozO L. REV. 1755 (2011); Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbe-
lievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REv. 347 (2012); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1111 (2011).
10. Cf Angela C. Carmella, Symbolic Religious Expression on Public Property: Implications for
the Integrity ofReligious Associations, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 481 (2011); Garrett Epps, Some Animals
Are More Equal than Others: The Rehnquist Court and "Majority Religion ", 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY
323 (2006); Feldman, supra note 4; Steven G. Gey, "Under God," the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Other
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865 (2003); Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992); Susan
Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text
Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139
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Establishment Clause, expanding upon these themes through a close look at
the 2004 and 2005 cases Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, I
Van Orden v. Perry,12 and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky.13 The Article concludes that the ongoing debates
among Supreme Court Justices over the relevance of religious minority
perspectives contribute to more general divisions that continue to character-
ize the current state of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
I. PRE-LEMON CASES: RECOGNIZING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court decided a number of landmark
cases that illustrate some of the Court's attempts to grapple with the in-
creasing religious diversity in American society and the potential effect of
these demographic changes on the interpretation and application of the
Establishment Clause. In addition to setting the landscape for future devel-
opment of Establishment Clause doctrine, these early cases evidence a
realization among various Justices that effective adjudication of Establish-
ment Clause cases requires a recognition of-if not an appreciation for-a
wide range of perspectives on matters of religion.
A. McGowan v. Maryland
In the 1961 case McGowan v. Maryland, the Court upheld as constitu-
tional the enactment of Sunday Closing Laws that prohibited the retail sale
of various items on Sunday.14 In an impassioned dissenting opinion, Justice
Douglas framed the issue in a manner that emphasized a distinctly minority
perspective of religion: "The question is whether a State can impose crimi-
nal sanctions on those who, unlike the Christian majority that makes up our
society, worship on a different day or do not share the religious scruples of
the majority."' 5 As Justice Douglas explained:
If the "free exercise" of religion were subject to reasonable regulations,
as it is under some constitutions, or if all laws "respecting the establish-
ment of religion" were not proscribed, I could understand how rational
men, representing a predominantly Christian civilization, might think
these Sunday laws did not unreasonably interfere with anyone's free ex-
(2006); Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalization and
Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1211 (2011).
11. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
12. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
13. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
14. 366 U.S. 420,453 (1961).
15. Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ercise of religion and took no step toward a burdensome establishment of
any religion. But that is not the premise from which we start. 16
Instead, Justice Douglas offered an analysis that drew upon Felix Co-
hen's observation that "[flor most judges, for most lawyers, for most hu-
man beings, we are as unconscious of our value patterns as we are of the
oxygen that we breathe."17 To illustrate the significance of religious per-
spectives, Justice Douglas presented counterfactual hypotheticals highlight-
ing the biases he uncovered underlying the decision to uphold the
constitutionality of Sunday Closing Laws:
The issue of those cases would therefore be in better focus if we imag-
ined that a state legislature, controlled by orthodox Jews and Seventh-
Day Adventists, passed a law making it a crime to keep a shop open on
Saturdays. Would a Baptist, Catholic, Methodist, or Presbyterian be
compelled to obey that law or go to jail or pay a fine? Or suppose Mos-
lems grew in political strength here and got a law through a state legisla-
ture making it a crime to keep a shop open on Fridays. Would the rest of
us have to submit under the fear of criminal sanctions?18
Likewise, according to Justice Douglas, the Sunday Closing Laws
were an expression of dominant religious perspectives: "No matter how
much is written, no matter what is said, the parentage of these laws is the
Fourth Commandment; and they serve and satisfy the religious predisposi-
tions of our Christian communities."1 9 Thus, he found, in upholding the
Sunday Closing Laws, the majority of the Court improperly disregarded the
effect of the laws on religious minorities: "[I]t is a strange Bill of Rights
that makes it possible for the dominant religious group to bring the minori-
ty to heel because the minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically are
wholesome and not antisocial, does not defer to the majority's religious
beliefs." 20 Indeed, he explained, "[a] legislature of Christians can no more
make minorities conform to their weekly regime than a legislature of Mos-
lems, or a legislature of Hindus." 21
Therefore, Justice Douglas concluded:
[T]he Sunday laws ... force minorities to obey the majority's religious
feelings of what is due and proper for a Christian community; they pro-
vide a coercive spur to the "weaker brethren," to those who are indiffer-
ent to the claims of a Sabbath through apathy or scruple. Can there be
any doubt that Christians, now aligned vigorously in favor of these laws,
would be as strongly opposed if they were prosecuted under a Moslem
16. Id.
17. Id. at 565 (quoting FELIX COHEN, LEGAL CONSCIENCE 169 (1960)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 572-73.
20. Id. at 575.
21. Id
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law that forbade them from engaging in secular activities on days that
violated Moslem scruples? 22
Somewhat ironically, the Court's decision to uphold the Sunday Clos-
ing Laws was, in part, similarly premised on an acknowledgment of the
religious diversity that comprised American society. As Chief Justice War-
ren noted in his plurality opinion in the companion case, Braunfeld v.
Brown, "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference. These denominations number almost
three hundred." 23 However, rather than emphasizing the Court's responsi-
bility to guard against laws that impose majoritarian perspectives, Chief
Justice Warren instead seemed to view the prevalence and proliferation of
religious minorities as a justification for neglecting minority perspectives.
As he continued:
[I]t cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law
regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic disad-
vantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the special
practices of the various religions. We do not believe that such an effect is
an absolute test for determining whether the legislation violates the free-
dom of religion protected by the First Amendment. 24
Significantly, just as Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas articu-
lated very different approaches to the application of the Religion Clauses in
light of the nation's religious diversity, a similar tension continues to un-
derlie much of the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence. In their
ongoing efforts to confront these issues, Justices remain sharply divided
over the extent to which the Court's jurisprudence should take into account
religious minority perspectives.
B. Torcaso v. Watkins
Notwithstanding the Court's holdings in McGowan and Braunfeld, in
a number of Establishment Clause cases that soon followed, the Court
demonstrated a willingness to appreciate the perspectives of religious mi-
norities and nonbelievers. Just a few weeks later, the Court decided
Torcaso v. Watkins, unanimously striking down a Maryland law that re-
quired "a declaration of belief in the existence of God" as a prerequisite for
holding "office of profit or trust in this State." 25 Writing for seven of the
Justices, Justice Black's majority opinion emphasized the need to protect
the interests of both religious minorities and nonbelievers: "Neither [a State
22. Id. at 576.
23. 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (plurality opinion).
24. Id. at 606-07.
25. 367 U.S. 488, 489, 496 (1961).
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nor the Federal Government] can constitutionally pass laws or impose re-
quirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs." 26
C Engel v. Vitale
One year later almost to the date, in Engel v. Vitale, the Court struck
down a practice adopted by a New York public school district to recite a
prayer in class at the start of each school day.27 Again writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Black further expressed his concern for the perspectives of
religious minorities: "When the power, prestige, and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coer-
cive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing offi-
cially approved religion is plain." 28
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart rejected these concerns, turn-
ing instead to "the history of the religious traditions of our people, reflected
in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government." 29
Developing a theme that continues to play a central role in the Court's di-
vided Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Justice Stewart cited instances
in which the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President have traditionally
invoked references and petitions to God.30 Insisting that "[c]ountless simi-
lar examples could be listed, but there is no need to belabor the obvious,"
Justice Stewart concluded that "[i]t was all summed up by this Court just
ten years ago in a single sentence." 31 Namely, he quoted from Justice
Douglas's opinion in the 1952 case Zorach v. Clauson, declaring that
"'[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.'"32
Notably, in a concurring opinion in Engel, Justice Douglas likewise
quoted from his own 1952 opinion,33 but according to Justice Douglas,
acknowledging the religious character of American society was merely the
beginning of the analysis. Notwithstanding the Constitution's allowance to
"mak[e] religion an active force in our lives," 34 he emphasized that the
26. Id. at 495.
27. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
28. Id. at 431.
29. Id, at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. Id at 446-49.
31. Id. at 450.
32. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
33. Id. at 447 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).
34. Id. at 442-43.
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Constitution protects other perspectives and positions as well: "the atheist
or agnostic-the nonbeliver-is entitled to go his own way." 35 In short, "a
government neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious inter-
ests." 36 Indeed, whatever the merit, as a descriptive matter, of depicting the
United States as a "religious people" that accepts a Supreme Being, Justice
Stewart's focus on majoritarian religious practice and belief excludes from
Establishment Clause adjudication any consideration of the perspectives of
nonbelievers and religious minorities.
D. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
Finally, yet one more year later-again nearly to the date, and again
over the dissent of Justice Stewart-in School District of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, the Court struck down state laws that mandated reading
from the Bible at the start of each school day.37 In a lengthy concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized the perspectives of religious minori-
ties and nonbelievers. For example, refusing to accept the historical record
as proof of the constitutionality of religious practices in American public
schools, Justice Brennan noted the demographic changes that had taken
place in the religious makeup of American society:
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than
were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant
sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including
as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as
well of those who worship according to no version of the Bible and those
who worship no God at all. In the face of such profound changes, prac-
tices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jeffer-
son and Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the
deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.38
Similarly, rejecting the argument that reading from the Bible should
be allowed because the school varied the version of the Bible that it used
on different days, Justice Brennan further observed:
[A]ny version of the Bible is inherently sectarian... . To vary the version
as the Abington and Baltimore schools have done may well be less of-
fensive than to read from the King James version every day, as once was
the practice. But the result even of this relatively benign procedure is that
majority sects are preferred in approximate proportion to their represen-
tation in the community and in the student body, while the smaller sects
suffer commensurate discrimination. So long as the subject matter of the
35. Id. at 443.
36. Id.
37. 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
38. Id. at 240-41 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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exercise is sectarian in character, these consequences cannot be avoid-
ed.39
Thus, in three consecutive years in the early 1960s, the Supreme Court
relied, in part, on the perspectives of religious minorities and nonbelievers
as grounds for finding Establishment Clause violations. The Court thus
demonstrated a willingness and ability to appreciate the extent to which
laws may impermissibly reflect dominant and majoritarian religious per-
spectives. Accordingly, the Court interpreted the Establishment Clause not
only to prohibit the establishment of the practices or beliefs of a particular
religious sect, but also to preclude more general governmental support of
religious practices and expressions that marginalize non-adherents and
nonbelievers.
II. POST-LEMON CASES: RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
DIVISION
In 1971, the Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, setting forth a three-
pronged test for adjudicating Establishment Clause cases: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion."' 40 In practice, rather than providing a clear standard for interpreting
the Establishment Clause, Lemon quickly became the source of disagree-
ment among Supreme Court Justices, who differed substantially over the
appropriate application of the Lemon test.
Although many factors have contributed to these divisions, questions
revolving around the relevance of religious perspectives serve as a central
point of contention in the adjudication of Establishment Clause cases. A
number of Supreme Court decisions between the years 1983 and 1995 illus-
trate the continuing and increasing disputes among Justices over whether,
and to what extent, the Establishment Clause should be viewed through the
perspectives of religious minorities and nonbelievers.
A. Marsh and Lynch-Setting the Stage
1. Marsh v. Chambers
In 1983, the Court decided Marsh v. Chambers, upholding the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
39. Id. at 282-83.
40. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation omitted).
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by a chaplain paid by the state.41 Much of Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion documented what he termed "the unambiguous and unbroken his-
tory of more than 200 years" during which "the practice of opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society." 42
Accordingly, he found, "[to] invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'estab-
lishment' of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this coun-
try." 43 Finally, he quoted from Justice Douglas's 1952 declaration that the
United States was "a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being."44
Although Chief Justice Burger portrayed his approach as merely rec-
ognizing the place of religion in American society, the rhetoric he used and
the conclusions he reached betray an attitude that favors dominant religious
views while disregarding others. Indeed, the opinion adopts an expressly
majoritarian perspective, stating that legislative prayer is simply the gov-
ernment's "acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of
this country." 45 Of course, the unstated corollary to this statement is that
the government is free to ignore the religious views and sensitivities of
those among the American people who do not share these beliefs.
Likewise, the opinion does not identify which segments of society are
included as part of "[w]e" who "are a religious people" 46 and does not ex-
plain on what grounds those who do not believe in a Supreme Being should
be excluded. Moreover, while Justice Douglas might have accurately de-
picted the United States as "a religious people" in 1952, demographic
changes that had taken place in the course of thirty years rendered ques-
tionable Chief Justice Burger's abiding reliance on this observation. In any
event, as Justice Douglas made clear in Engel, observations about prevail-
ing religious beliefs of the United States are but the beginning of the Estab-
lishment Clause analysis, and do not permit the government to act in a way
that disregards the interests of religious minorities or nonbelievers.
In a lengthy dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan of-
fered two primary critiques of the majority opinion, drawing upon themes
that continue to play a central role in the fault lines underlying the Court's
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. First, Justice Brennan chided
41. 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
42. Id. at 792.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 792 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id. (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).
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the majority for appealing to the history of legislative prayer in place of an
analysis based on Lemon. As he put it, "[t]he Court makes no pretense of
subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal
'tests' that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establishment
Clause."47 "In effect," he argued, "the Court holds that officially sponsored
legislative prayer, primarily on account of its 'unique history,' is generally
exempted from the First Amendment's prohibition against 'an establish-
ment of religion.' 48
According to Justice Brennan, it "should be obvious [] that, if the
Court were to judge legislative prayer through the unsentimental eye of our
settled doctrine, it would have to strike it down as a clear violation of the
Establishment Clause."49 In fact, he declared sharply, "I have no doubt that,
if any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to
the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the
practice to be unconstitutional." 5 0
Second, Justice Brennan rejected the majority's attempts to minimize
the religious nature of the legislative prayer, responding with a brief primer
on the various objections legislative prayer might elicit. As a threshold
matter, he "put to one side, not because of its irrelevance, but because of its
obviousness, the fact that any official prayer will pose difficulties both for
nonreligious persons and for religious persons whose faith does not include
the institution of prayer." 51
Yet even for those whose religious beliefs include prayer, he argued,
"any practice of legislative prayer, even if it might look 'non-sectarian' to
nine Justices of the Supreme Court, will inevitably and continuously in-
volve the State in one or another religious debate." 52 For example:
Some religious individuals or groups find it theologically problematic to
engage in joint religious exercises predominantly influenced by faiths
not their own. Some might object even to the attempt to fashion a "non-
sectarian" prayer.. . . Some might find any petitionary prayer to be im-
proper. Some might find any prayer that lacked a petitionary element to
be deficient. Some might be troubled by what they consider shallow pub-
lic prayer, or nonspontaneous prayer, or prayer without adequate spiritu-
al preparation or concentration. Some might, of course, have theological
objections to any prayer sponsored by an organ of government ... And
47. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 796.
50. Id. at 800-01.
51. Id. at 819 n.40.
52. Id. at 819.
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some might object on theological grounds to the Court's requirement that
prayer, even though religious, not be proselytizing. 53
In a brief dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens added the concern that
the chaplains selected to conduct legislative prayers will typically be drawn
from the ranks of a majoritarian religion, while some religious minorities
will almost always be excluded:
In a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs of the chap-
lain tend to reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers' constitu-
ents. Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts
Legislature and by a Presbyterian minister in the Nebraska Legislature,
but I would not expect to find a Jehovah's Witness or a disciple of Mary
Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the official chaplain in any
state legislature. . . .[I]t seems plain to me that the designation of a mem-
ber of one religious faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state
legislature for a period of 16 years constitutes the preference of one faith
over another in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 54
2. Lynch v. Donnelly
One year later, in Lynch v. Donnelly, a deeply divided Court upheld a
city's inclusion of a cr6che as part of a public Christmas display.55 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger again invoked the reference to the
United States as a "religious people" 56 and, in place of a formal application
of the Lemon test, he premised his analysis on the historical record of gov-
ernmental involvement in practices that were religious in nature. Accord-
ingly, he concluded:
It would be ironic ... if the inclusion of a single symbol of a particular
historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in the
Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, by the
Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would
so "taint" the city's exhibit as to render it violative of the Establishment
Clause.57
In another extensive dissenting opinion, this time joined by three other
Justices, Justice Brennan again focused, in large part, on "our remarkable
and precious religious diversity as a Nation, which the Establishment
Clause seeks to protect."58 Indeed, according to Justice Brennan, the facts
in Lynch proved particularly challenging precisely because of majoritarian
53. Id. at 819-21 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 823-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
56. Id. at 675 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
57. Id. at 686.
58. Id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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acceptance of the creche and, more generally, the Christmas holiday. As he
put it, "[a]fter reviewing the Court's opinion, I am convinced that this case
appears hard not because the principles of decision are obscure, but be-
cause the Christmas holiday seems so familiar and agreeable." 59
For this reason, Justice Brennan found it necessary to articulate, at
length, the religious nature of the creche and the message conveyed in its
display by the government. Once again, Justice Brennan emphasized the
potential of the display to carry a variety of very different meanings, de-
pending on the religious perspective of the beholder:
Those who believe in the message of the nativity receive the unique and
exclusive benefit of public recognition and approval of their views. For
many, the city's decision to include the creche as part of its extensive
and costly efforts to celebrate Christmas can only mean that the prestige
of the government has been conferred on the beliefs associated with the
cr6che.... The effect on minority religious groups, as well as on those
who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their views are
not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support.
It was precisely this sort of religious chauvinism that the Establishment
Clause was intended forever to prohibit.60
Moreover, Justice Brennan noted that
[T]he creche retains a specifically Christian religious meaning. I refuse
to accept the notion implicit in today's decision that non-Christians
would find that the religious content of the creche is eliminated by the
fact that it appears as part of the city's otherwise secular celebration of
the Christmas holiday . . . It is the chief symbol of the characteristically
Christian belief that a divine Savior was brought into the world and that
the purpose of this miraculous birth was to illuminate a path toward sal-
vation and redemption. For Christians, that path is exclusive, precious
and holy. But for those who do not share these beliefs, the symbolic
reenactment of the birth of a divine being who has been miraculously in-
carnated as a man stands as a dramatic reminder of their differences with
Christian faith .... To be so excluded on religious grounds by one's
elected government is an insult and an injury that, until today, could not
be countenanced by the Establishment Clause. 61
In the face of Justice Brennan's dissent, Chief Justice Burger
acknowledged that "[o]f course the cr6che is identified with one religious
faith."62 Yet, relying on the precedential authority and doctrinal analysis of
59. Id
60. Id. at 701.
61. Id. at 708-09; cf id at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The import of the Court's decision is
to encourage use of the cr6che in a municipally sponsored display, a setting where . .. non-Christians
feel alienated by its presence."); id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[E]ndorsement or disapproval
of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
62. Id at 685.
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McGowan and Marsh, he found the distinctly Christian character of the
cr6che to be "no more so than the examples we have set out from prior
cases in which we found no conflict with the Establishment Clause."63
B. 1985-1995: "Shards of Lemon"
Over the course of the ten years following Lynch, the Court decided a
number of other cases addressing instances of public prayer and the public
display of religious symbols. The Court would remain sharply divided in
many of these cases, producing the "shards of Lemon" Kent Greenawalt so
vividly portrayed to depict the state of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.64 A close look at four of these cases illustrates not only doc-
trinal divisions among the Justices, but also a deep and abiding division
with respect to the relevance of the perspectives of religious minorities for
the adjudication of Establishment Clause cases.
1. Wallace v. Jaffree
In the 1985 case Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of Alabama statutes authorizing moments of silence in public
schools for meditation and forms of prayer. 65 Emblematic of the continued
splintering of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the case
engendered a majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and three dissent-
ing opinions. Beyond the doctrinal divisions, the different opinions offer
alternate views on a number of crucial issues, including, among others,
historical matters and the relevance of minority perspectives.
In the majority opinion striking down the prayer statutes, Justice Ste-
vens relied, in part, on the historical development of the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, including the evolving sensitivity the Court had
demonstrated toward perspectives of religious minorities and nonbelievers.
In particular, Justice Stevens noted that:
At one time it was thought that [the Establishment Clause] merely pro-
scribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not
require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the
adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the
underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the
Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of con-
science protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select
any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion derives . . . from
63. Id. at 685-86.
64. See Greenawalt, supra note 1.
65. 472 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1985).
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recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance
extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects-or even intolerance
among "religions"-to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the
uncertain.66
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor likewise emphasized the
perspective of the nonadherent. Building on a similar argument she had
raised in a concurring opinion in Lynch, Justice O'Connor asserted that the
Lemon test should be "refine[d]" through an analysis of whether the gov-
ernment's action constituted an "endorsement" of religion or a religious
practice or belief.67 Relying on both her concurrence in Lynch and the
Court's opinion in Engel, Justice O'Connor explained that:
The endorsement test ... does preclude government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious be-
lief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the religious
liberty of the nonadherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain."68
Justice Rehnquist issued a lengthy dissenting opinion, premised on the
argument that "[t]he true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be
seen in its history." 69 Of course, Justice Rehnquist's view of history dif-
fered, substantially and fundamentally, from Justice Stevens' historical
analysis, which focused on the evolution of the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Instead, relying exclusively on what he characterized
as the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that, "[a]s its history abundantly shows .. . nothing in the Estab-
lishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion
and irreligion." 70 Explicitly disregarding the perspectives of nonbelievers,
Justice Rehnquist thus exposed yet another fault line in the Court's inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause.
2. County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pitts-
burgh Chapter
The Court was even more divided in a 1989 case, County ofAllegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, which gave
rise to a plethora of opinions, including: an opinion by Justice Blackmun,
joined in part by a majority of the Court, a concurring opinion by Justice
66. Id. at 52-54.
67. Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 70 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
69. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
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O'Connor, joined in part by two other Justices, and three additional opin-
ions, each of which concurred and dissented in part and was joined, in part,
by two or three other Justices. 71 Returning to the issue of religious sym-
bols, the Court considered the constitutionality of the city's display of a
creche and a menorah. 72
In one of the sections of his opinion that commanded a majority of the
Court, Justice Blackmun noted the prevalence and significance of religious
diversity within American society:
This Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious diversity that
dates from the settlement of the North American Continent. Sectarian
differences among various Christian denominations were central to the
origins of our Republic. Since then, adherents of religions too numerous
to name have made the United States their home, as have those whose
beliefs expressly exclude religion.73
Accordingly, Justice Blackmun emphasized the importance of inter-
preting the Constitution in a way that recognizes and protects diverse per-
spectives toward religion:
Precisely because of the religious diversity that is our national heritage,
the Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of Rights, the very first
words of which declare: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Per-
haps in the early days of the Republic these words were understood to
protect only the diversity within Christianity, but today they are recog-
nized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to "the infidel, the
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Juda-
ism." 74
In another part of his opinion, joined only by Justice Stevens, Justice
Blackmun again focused on differences in religious perspectives, and the
need to protect the rights of nonadherents:
[T]he Court has made clear that, when evaluating the effect of govern-
ment conduct under the Establishment Clause, we must ascertain wheth-
er "the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorse-
ment, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual reli-
gious choices." 75
Justice O'Connor expressed similar concerns. Building yet again on
her concurrence in Lynch, Justice O'Connor found that:
71. 492 U.S. 573, 577 (1989).
72. Id at 578.
73. Id at 589.
74. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).




[T]he creche displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse, the seat of county government, conveys a message to
nonadherents of Christianity that they are not full members of the politi-
cal community, and a corresponding message to Christians that they are
favored members of the political community. 76
Significantly, in considering the constitutionality of the menorah dis-
play, Justice O'Connor raised the broader issue of "whether the govern-
mental display of a minority faith's religious symbol could ever reasonably
be understood to convey a message of endorsement of that faith." 77 In an
analysis that highlighted the extent to which the meaning of religious sym-
bols depends on the religious perspective of the beholder, Justice O'Connor
acknowledged that, in principle, "[a] menorah standing alone at city hall
may well send such a message to nonadherents, just as in this case the
creche standing alone at the Allegheny County Courthouse sends a mes-
sage of governmental endorsement of Christianity."78 Although, given the
context of the menorah's display, Justice O'Connor found no such en-
dorsement in this case, her analysis demonstrates a consistent willingness
on her part to take into account different religious perspectives when apply-
ing the Establishment Clause.
In an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Ste-
vens likewise considered a range of religious perspectives, reaching the
conclusion that "the Establishment Clause should be construed to create a
strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public
property." 79 As he noted, "[t]here is always a risk that such symbols will
offend nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents who
consider the particular advertisement disrespectful." 80 For example,
"[s]ome devout Christians believe that the creche should be placed only in
reverential settings, such as a church or perhaps a private home[,]" while
"[i]n this very suit, members of the Jewish faith firmly opposed the use to
which the menorah was put by the particular sect that sponsored the display
at Pittsburgh's City-County Building." 8 In short, "displays of this kind
inevitably have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt
differences among individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal. The
Establishment Clause does not allow public bodies to foment such disa-
greement." 82
76. Id. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 634.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 650-51.
81. Id. at 651.
82. Id.
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For Justice Brennan, the inclusion of the menorah only added to the
religious-and particularly Christian-message the display sent to both
adherents of other religious traditions and nonadherents. Responding to
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens, Justice Brennan declared: "I know of no principle under
the Establishment Clause. . . that permits us to conclude that governmental
promotion of religion is acceptable so long as one religion is not favored.
We have, on the contrary, interpreted that Clause to require neutrality, not
just among religions, but between religion and nonreligion."83 Moreover,
Justice Brennan found, the government's exclusive participation in Chanu-
kah among all of the Jewish holidays "has the effect of promoting a Chris-
tianized version of Judaism. The holiday calendar they appear willing to
accept revolves exclusively around a Christian holiday." 84 Finally, he con-
cluded, "those religions that have no holiday at all during the period be-
tween Thanksgiving and New Year's Day will not benefit, even in a
second-class manner, from the city's once-a-year tribute to 'liberty' and
'freedom of belief.' This is not 'pluralism' as I understand it."85
In sharp contrast to the majority of Justices, who-though they dif-
fered somewhat in result-carefully considered religious minority perspec-
tives, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Scalia, found the focus on the perspectives of nonadherents ir-
reconcilable with the nation's history of religious practice. As Justice Ken-
nedy put it:
If the endorsement test, applied without artificial exceptions for histori-
cal practice, reached results consistent with history, my objections to it
would have less force. But, as I understand that test, the touchstone of an
Establishment Clause violation is whether nonadherents would be made
to feel like "outsiders" by government recognition or accommodation of
religion. Few of our traditional practices recognizing the part religion
plays in our society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of
this formula.86
Notably, Justice Kennedy did not dispute the contention that the dis-
plays might offend the sensitivities of both nonadherents and religious ad-
herents:
It must be conceded that, however neutral the purpose of the city and
county, the eager proselytizer may seek to use these symbols for his own
ends. The urge to use them to teach or to taunt is always present. It is al-
so true that some devout adherents of Judaism or Christianity may be as
83. Id. at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id at 645.
85. Id at 645-46.
86. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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offended by the holiday display as are nonbelievers, if not more so. To
place these religious symbols in a common hallway or sidewalk, where
they may be ignored or even insulted, must be distasteful to many who
cherish their meaning.87
Instead, Justice Kennedy rejected outright the relevance of these con-
siderations to the application of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, turning
on its head the view that dedication to religious pluralism and diversity
renders such displays impermissible, he concluded that:
Our role is enforcement of a written Constitution. In my view, the prin-
ciples of the Establishment Clause and our Nation's historic traditions of
diversity and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable judg-
ments respecting the accommodation or acknowledgment of holidays
with both cultural and religious aspects. No constitutional violation oc-
curs when they do so by displaying a symbol of the holiday's religious
origins.88
3. Lee v. Weisman
In the 1992 case, Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy again acknowl-
edged the sensitivities of religious minorities and nonbelievers. 89 This time,
however, Justice Kennedy wrote the Court's majority opinion striking
down the practice of offering "nonsectarian" prayers by a member of a
clergy at public high school graduation ceremonies. Justice Kennedy's
analysis emphasized the relevance of religious minority perspectives and
perceptions in interpreting and applying the Establishment Clause:
What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable re-
quest that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school
context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy. . . .
There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at the
graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of
participation in the rabbi's prayer. That was the very point of the reli-
gious exercise. It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that
for her the act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect,
rather than participation. What matters is that, given our social conven-
tions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group
exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.90
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy found the "nonsectarian" nature of the
prayer to no avail: "That the intrusion was in the course of promulgating
religion that sought to be civic or nonsectarian rather than pertaining to one
sect does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors. At best it nar-
87. Id. at 678.
88. Id. at 679.
89. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
90. Id. at 592-93.
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rows their number, at worst increases their sense of isolation and affront." 91
Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded:
While in some societies the wishes of the majority might prevail, the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment is addressed to this contin-
gency and rejects the balance urged upon us. The Constitution forbids
the State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of at-
tending her own high school graduation. This is the calculus the Consti-
tution commands. 92
Justice Scalia dissented, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White and Thomas. Contrasting Justice Kennedy's opinion in County
ofAllegheny, which he had joined, with the majority opinion in Lee, Justice
Scalia highlighted what he saw as a fundamental change in Justice Kenne-
dy's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As Justice Scalia recalled, the
opinion in County ofAllegheny recognized
that the Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the
"[g]ovemment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and sup-
port for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political and cultural
heritage." That opinion affirmed that "the meaning of the Clause is to be
determined by reference to historical practices and understandings." It
said that "[a] test for implementing the protections of the Establishment
Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding
traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause." 93
In contrast, Justice Scalia characterized the majority opinion in Weis-
man as "conspicuously bereft of any reference to history."94
Responding directly to the majority's focus on the perspectives of re-
ligious minorities, Justice Scalia countered that "[t]he reader has been
told ... very little about the personal interests on the other
91. Id. at 594.
92. Id at 596; cf id. at 606 (Blackmun J., concurring) ("The mixing of government and religion
can be a threat to free government, even if no one is forced to participate. When the government puts its
imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to
the favored beliefs.").
Many Americans who consider themselves religious are not theistic; some, like several of the
Framers, are deists who would question Rabbi Gutterman's plea for divine advancement of
the country's political and moral good. Thus, a nonpreferentialist who would condemn sub-
jecting public school graduates to, say, the Anglican liturgy would still need to explain why
the government's preference for theistic over nontheistic religion is constitutional.
Nor does it solve the problem to say that the State should promote a "diversity" of religious
views; that position would necessarily compel the government and, inevitably, the courts to
make wholly inappropriate judgments about the number of religions the State should sponsor
and the relative frequency with which it should sponsor each. In fact, the prospect would be
even worse than that.
Id. at 617 (Souter, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
94. Id at 631.
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side . .. [, which] are not inconsequential." 95 Thus, Justice Scalia proceed-
ed to consider the meaning of public prayer from the perspective of believ-
ers, which in his view embodied the historical traditions of the United
States and the proper understanding of the Constitution:
Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it nec-
essary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people, and
not just as individuals, because they believe in the "protection of divine
Providence," as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for indi-
viduals but for societies; because they believe God to be, as Washing-
ton's first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the "Great Lord and Ruler
of Nations." One can believe in the effectiveness of such public worship,
or one can deprecate and deride it. But the longstanding American tradi-
tion of prayer at official ceremonies displays with unmistakable clarity
that the Establishment Clause does not forbid the government to accom-
modate it.96
On the basis of this historical analysis, Justice Scalia did not hesitate
to favor majoritarian religious perspectives over those of religious minori-
ties and nonbelievers:
The narrow context of the present case involves a community's celebra-
tion of one of the milestones in its young citizens' lives, and it is a bold
step for this Court to seek to banish from that occasion, and from thou-
sands of similar celebrations throughout this land, the expression of grat-
itude to God that a majority of the community wishes to make. The issue
before us today is not the abstract philosophical question whether the al-
temative of frustrating this desire of a religious majority is to be pre-
ferred over the alternative of imposing "psychological coercion," or a
feeling of exclusion, upon nonbelievers. Rather, the question is whether
a mandatory choice in favor of the former has been imposed by the Unit-
ed States Constitution. As the age-old practices of our people show, the
answer to that question is not at all in doubt.97
Finally, placing his own gloss on the issue of American religious di-
versity, Justice Scalia insisted that the interests in promoting joint commu-
nal prayer among religions outweighed the interests of nonbelievers:
The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectarian
religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife. And they also
knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among re-
ligious believers of various faiths a toleration-no, an affection-for one
another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom
they all worship and seek.... The Baptist or Catholic who heard andjoined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this of-
ficial and patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and
prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our society of
that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare the nonbeliever
95. Id. at 645.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 645-46 (emphasis in original).
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what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting
in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupport-
ed in law. 98
4. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette
Finally, in the 1995 case Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board
v. Pinette, addressing yet another religious display, the Court responded
with a variety of opinions, written and joined by numerous combinations of
Justices, reflecting the entrenched divisions that had taken hold of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 99 In an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a display of a Latin
cross by a private organization on state capitol grounds.100 In a section of
his opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Scalia rejected as un-
workable the principle that, in allowing the display of the cross, the state
could reasonably be perceived as endorsing religion.' 0 According to Jus-
tice Scalia, such an approach, if applied in the context a public school,
would require a school district "to guess whether some undetermined criti-
cal mass of the community might . .. perceive the district to be advocating
a religious viewpoint." 02
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens relied on County ofAllegheny
and Lynch to once again focus on the perspective of the nonadherent:
It is especially important to take into account the perspective of a reason-
able observer who may not share the particular religious belief it ex-
presses. A paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect
such a person from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of faith,
and a stranger in the political community. If a reasonable person could
perceive a government endorsement of religion from a private display,
then the State may not allow its property to be used as a forum for that
display. No less stringent rule can adequately protect nonadherents from
a well-grounded perception that their sovereign supports a faith to which
they do not subscribe.103
98. Id. at 646.
99. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). The opinions included: Justice Scalia's opinion, parts of which constitut-
ed the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, and Breyer, and part of which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy
and Thomas; Justice Thomas's concurring opinion; Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer; Justice Souter's opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment , joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer; Justice Stevens' dissent-
ing opinion; and Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion.
100. Id. at 770.
101. Id. at 767 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Although she concurred in the judgment and in some sections of Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion, Justice O'Connor did not concur with his dismissal of
the endorsement test on the grounds that it would require the state to antici-
pate the seemingly unidentifiable perceptions of segments of the communi-
ty.104 At the same time, Justice O'Connor found that Justice Stevens' view
placed too high a premium on the perspectives of nonadherents. 05
Instead, in further refinement of the endorsement test she had previ-
ously articulated in Lynch and County ofAllegheny, Justice O'Connor pro-
posed a standard that takes into account the perceptions of nonadherents,
but also injects a higher degree of reasonableness into the analysis:
[T]he endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular in-
dividuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of viewing
symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe.... In my view ... the
endorsement test creates a more collective standard to gauge "the 'objec-
tive' meaning of the [government's] statement in the community." 106
For Justice O'Connor, such a standard strikes an appropriate balance
because it "neither chooses the perceptions of the majority over those of a
'reasonable nonadherent,' nor invites disregard for the values the Estab-
lishment Clause was intended to protect."l 07 Rather, this approach "simply
recognizes[,] ... [t]here is always someone who, with a particular quantum
of knowledge, reasonably might perceive a particular action as an en-
dorsement of religion."108 Accordingly, under this rule, "[a] State has not
made religion relevant to standing in the political community simply be-
cause a particular viewer of a display might feel uncomfortable." 09
III. RECENT CASES: ELK GROVE, VAN ORDEN, AND MCCREARY COUNTY
As demonstrated in this brief survey of Supreme Court cases, deep
and abiding divisions in the interpretation and application of the Establish-
ment Clause often center, in part, on Justices' divergent views toward the
relevance and significance of the perspectives of religious minorities and
nonbelievers. Likewise, religious perspectives have played a crucial role in
more recent Establishment Clause cases, as the Court has repeatedly revis-
ited many of the themes that emerged in pre-Lemon cases and profoundly
104. Id.
105. Id at 779.
106. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor J., concurring)).
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influenced the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the decades
that followed. The ever-increasing religious diversity in the United States,
coupled with increased public attention to the views of nonbelievers, sug-
gests that that the future of the Establishment Clause will continue to in-
volve fundamental questions about the impact of religious minority
perspectives.
A. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
In 2004, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Su-
preme Court finally addressed a practice that, for many years, had been a
source of constitutional controversy and confusion: the recitation in public
schools of the Pledge of Allegiance, containing the words "under God." 10
Although a majority of the Court avoided a substantive Establishment
Clause analysis, on the grounds that the plaintiff did not have standing to
sue, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas each
filed a concurring opinion addressing many of the substantive constitution-
al issues raised by the case.
Turning again to historical instances of governmental declarations that
invoked religious themes, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected any concern that
the inclusion of the words "under God" violated the Establishment
Clause. 111 Distinguishing the Pledge of Allegiance from the kind of "reli-
gious exercise" the Court had struck down in Lee, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that:
The phrase "under God" is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement of
any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact noted in H.R.Rep. No.
1693, at 2: "From the time of our earliest history our peoples and our in-
stitutions have reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was
founded on a fundamental belief in God."11 2
Thus, he found, "[r]eciting the Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is
a patriotic exercise, not a religious one." 1 3 Rather, he concluded, "partici-
pants promise fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God,
faith, or church."ll 4
Though she joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in full, Jus-
tice O'Connor issued a concurring opinion of her own, once again clarify-
ing and refining the endorsement test. Perhaps surprisingly, while
acknowledging the broad range of religious perspectives that characterize
110. 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).






American society, Justice O'Connor seemed to view religious diversity as a
reason for limiting the scope of the endorsement test. Quoting from her
concurrence in Pinette, Justice O'Connor explained that "because the en-
dorsement test seeks 'to identify those situations in which government
makes adherence to a religion relevant . .. to a person's standing in the
political community,' it assumes the viewpoint of a reasonable observ-
er."1 15 Accordingly, "[g]iven the dizzying religious heterogeneity of our
Nation, adopting a subjective approach would reduce the test to an absurdi-
ty. Nearly any government action could be overturned as a violation of the
Establishment Clause if a 'heckler's veto' sufficed to show that its message
was one of endorsement."' 16
In addition, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor minimized
the religious significance and potential Establishment Clause implications
of the phrase "under God." Developing at length a concept that had been
mentioned only passingly in two previous Supreme Court cases, Justice
O'Connor found that the inclusion of the phrase "under God" represented a
permissible form of "ceremonial deism."
Specifically, she declared that:
I believe that government can, in a discrete category of cases,
acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the Constitution.
This category of "ceremonial deism" most clearly encompasses such
things as the national motto ("In God We Trust"), religious references in
traditional patriotic songs such as The Star-Spangled Banner, and the
words with which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its sessions
("God save the United States and this honorable Court"). These refer-
ences are not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause to which I
turn a blind eye. Instead, their history, character, and context prevent
them from being constitutional violations at all. 117
Therefore, she continued "[t]his case requires us to determine whether
the appearance of the phrase 'under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance con-
stitutes an instance of such ceremonial deism." 18 Through an evaluation of
the Pledge's "history and ubiquity," "[a]bsence of worship or prayer,"
"[a]bsence of reference to a particular religion," and "[m]inimal religious
content," Justice O'Connor concluded that "[a]lthough it is a close ques-
tion," the Pledge of Alliance qualifies as permissible under the category of
ceremonial deism.119
115. Id at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
116. Id. at 34-35.
117. Id at 37 (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id at 37-43.
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Justice O'Connor's analysis is particularly notable for an acceptance
of a phrase that arguably reflects a majoritarian religious perspective un-
likely to be shared by nonbelievers and many religious minorities. For ex-
ample, Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[e]ven if taken literally, the phrase
[under God] is merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the United
States as a Nation subject to divine authority."l 20 However, as Justice
Thomas noted in a critique directed at Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis,
"[i]t is difficult to see how this does not entail an affirmation that God ex-
ists. Whether or not we classify affirming the existence of God as a 'formal
religious exercise' akin to prayer, it must present the same or similar con-
stitutional problems."l 21 Moreover, even Justice O'Connor's understanding
of the phrase as a "descriptive" declaration of the United States as "a Na-
tion subject to divine authority" excludes the perspective of both the nonbe-
liever and some religious minorities.
Likewise, the nonbeliever and many religious minorities would find
unconvincing Justice O'Connor's further explanation that the Pledge of
Allegiance does not violate the Establishment Clause because "[i]t does not
refer to a nation 'under Jesus' or 'under Vishnu,' but instead acknowledges
religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic 'God.'" 22 Indeed,
Justice O'Connor was quick to note that "[o]f course, some religions-
Buddhism, for instance-are not based upon a belief in a separate Supreme
Being."123 The same is true for other minority religions as well, and of
course, for nonbelievers.124
Yet, rather than finding that, whatever its origins, the phrase "under
God" currently sends a message of exclusion, Justice O'Connor instead
defended the use of the phrase on the grounds that "one would be hard
pressed to imagine a brief solemnizing reference to religion that would
adequately encompass every religious belief expressed by any citizen of
this Nation." 125 Under this logic, rather than serving as an impetus for
greater sensitivity to different systems of belief or nonbelief, increased
religious diversity serves to allow a plainly religious phrase, expressing a
particular form of religious belief, to escape constitutional scrutiny. As
Justice O'Connor concluded: "The phrase 'under God,' conceived and
120. Id. at 40.
121. Id. at 48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Id.
124. Cf Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1545 (2010). See also Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996); B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Cere-




added at a time when our national religious diversity was neither as robust
nor as well recognized as it is now, represents a tolerable attempt to
acknowledge religion and to invoke its solemnizing power without favoring
any individual religious sect or belief system." 26
B. Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky
In the 2005 companion cases Van Orden v. Perryl27 and McCreary
County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,128 the Supreme
Court confronted directly many of the issues left unaddressed and unre-
solved in the opinions in Elk Grove, providing a pronounced roadmap for
the future of the Establishment Clause. In particular, bringing together
many of the themes that had dominated the doctrinal and rhetorical tensions
characterizing the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence for nearly
half a century, the numerous opinions issued in Van Orden reflect a Su-
preme Court that remains as sharply divided as ever in its understanding of
the proper role of governmental participation in religious practices and
displays. As a further indication of these divisions, although both cases
involved the displays of the Ten Commandments on public grounds and
both cases resulted in five-to-four rulings, the Court held that the display in
Van Orden was constitutionally permissiblel 29 and the display in McCreary
violated the Establishment Clause.130
In Van Orden, the Court considered the constitutionality of a display,
on the Texas State Capitol grounds, of a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments.131 In a plurality opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Kenne-
dy, and Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the display did not
violate the Establishment Clause.132 Chief Justice Rehnquist introduced his
analysis by posing a dichotomy between "the strong role played by religion
and religious traditions throughout our Nation's history [and] . .. the prin-
ciple that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger
religious freedom."1 33
On the basis of this supposed dichotomy, he further posited that some
of the Court's Establishment Clause decisions "pointed to Lemon v.
126. Id.
127. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
128. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
129. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692.
130. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881.
131. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
132. Id.
133. Id at 683.
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Kurtzman as providing the governing test" while others "simply have not
applied the Lemon test [or] ... have applied it only after concluding that
the challenged practice was invalid under a different Establishment Clause
test."1 34 Finally, after casting additional doubt on the abiding vitality of
Lemon,135 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted, without elaboration, that the
Lemon test was simply "not useful in dealing with the sort of passive mon-
ument" at issue in Van Orden.136 In rejecting Lemon, the plurality opinion
rendered irrelevant any consideration of the impact the monument of the
Ten Commandments might have on the perceptions and sensitivities of
religious minorities and nonbelievers.
Relying instead on an approach that, in earlier cases, both he and a
number of other Justices had substituted for the Lemon test, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "our analysis is driven both by the nature of the
monument and by our Nation's history." 37 Accordingly, after quoting
Lynch's depiction of an "unbroken history of official acknowledgment by
all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life
from at least 1789,"the opinion proceeded to survey examples of govern-
mental involvement in religious statements and activities. 138 Yet, while
majoritarian-or even some minority-religious perspectives may find
unremarkable such forms of governmental support of religion, to nonbe-
lievers and many religious minorities, the government's endorsement of the
Ten Commandments sends a message of exclusion.
Indeed, this concern did not escape Chief Justice Rehnquist, who re-
turned to another approach previously developed in opinions permitting
public religious displays or prayer. Without denying the religious origins
and substance of the Ten Commandments, Chief Justice Rehnquist at-
tempted to minimize the religious function of the Ten Commandments
within American society.
Thus, on the one hand, he conceded: "Of course, the Ten Command-
ments are religious-they were so viewed at their inception and so remain.
The monument, therefore, has religious significance. According to Judeo-
Christian belief, the Ten Commandments were given to Moses by God on
Mt. Sinai."l 39 Nevertheless, he added that "Moses was a lawgiver as well
as a religious leader. And the Ten Commandments have an undeniable
134. Id. at 685-86 (citations omitted).




138. Id at 686-90 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).
139. Id. at 690.
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historical meaning." 40 Moreover, as he put it, the Ten Commandment
display in this case "has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and
government." 141 Therefore, he concluded, "[s]imply having religious con-
tent or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause." 42 Though Chief Justice Rehnquist
supported this conclusion with citations to cases such as Lynch, Marsh, and
McGowan, to the nonadherent, his efforts to downplay the religious nature
of the Ten Commandments on the basis of their historical value to the con-
trary rings unconvincing, if not disingenuous.143
Somewhat ironically, in responding to the plurality opinion, Justice
Thomas delineated at some length the religious significance of the Ten
Commandments and the effect of the display on the sensitivities of the
nonadherent. Repeating his critique of Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in
Elk Grove, Justice Thomas bluntly portrayed the Court's precedents as
"attempt[ing] to avoid declaring all religious symbols and words of
longstanding tradition unconstitutional, by counterfactually declaring them
of little religious significance."l44 Justice Thomas rejected these attempts
as unappealing and unsuccessful, finding it undeniable that "words such as
'God' have religious significance."l 45 Indeed, returning to the theme he had
developed in Elk Grove, Justice Thomas considered the Pledge of Alle-
giance from the perspective of a nonadherent, finding the phrase "under
God" to be "anathema to those who reject God's existence and a validation
of His existence to those who accept it."146 Further, he argued, "[t]elling
either nonbelievers or believers that the words 'under God' have no mean-
ing contradicts what they know to be true. Moreover, repetition does not
deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional meaning." 47
Likewise, Justice Thomas rejected as unavailing the "reasonable ob-
server" standard that Justice O'Connor had applied to evaluate the
nonadherent's perceptions of governmental involvement in a religious
practice or display.148 Instead, he considered the perspective of the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 692.
142. Id. at 690.
143. Cf Laycock, supra note 10, at 1220-21. In addition, religious adherents may likewise take
offense at attempts to downplay the religious significance of symbols and activities they consider
sacred. See, e.g., David M. Cobin, Criches, Christmas Trees and Menorahs: Weeds Growing in Roger
Williams' Garden, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1597 (1990); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and
the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1831 (2009).
144. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 695.
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nonadherent who "may well be more sensitive than the hypothetical 'rea-
sonable observer,' or who may not know all the facts."l 49 For such an indi-
vidual, the reasonableness standard "fails to capture completely the honest
and deeply felt offense he takes from the government conduct." 50
However, notwithstanding the careful focus Justice Thomas placed on
the sensitivities of the nonadherent, he joined the plurality opinion, praising
Chief Justice Rehnquist for "properly recogniz[ing] the role of religion in
this Nation's history and the permissibility of government displays ac-
knowledging that history." 5' In fact, according to Justice Thomas, "[t]here
is no question that, based on the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause, the Ten Commandments display at issue here is constitutional"
because "[i]n no sense does Texas compel petitioner Van Orden to do any-
thing. The only injury to him is that he takes offense at seeing the monu-
ment." 52 Effectively, then, though he emphasized the perspective of the
nonadherent, Justice Thomas ultimately found that perspective irrelevant to
his understanding of the Establishment Clause.
Though he likewise joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion,
Justice Scalia added a two-sentence concurrence of his own, articulating an
approach wholly dismissive of the relevance of religious minority perspec-
tives. Justice Scalia stated categorically that "there is nothing unconstitu-
tional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public
prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating
the Ten Commandments." 5 3 Finally, though he did not join the plurality
opinion, Justice Breyer cast the deciding vote in favor of allowing the dis-
play, on the grounds that it held a "mixed but primarily nonreligious pur-
pose."l 54
In sharp contrast to these views, again illustrating the deep and fun-
damental divisions among the Justices in their understanding of the Estab-
lishment Clause, the dissenters in Van Orden characterized the display of
the Ten Commandments as an unquestionably impermissible endorsement
of a sectarian religious position. As Justice Stevens stated succinctly: "The
message transmitted by Texas' chosen display is quite plain: This State
endorses the divine code of the 'Judeo-Christian' God." 55
149. Id.
150. Id. at 696-97.
151. Id. at 692.
152. Id. at 694.
I53. Id at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, in the course of his lengthy dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens forcefully emphasized the religious nature of
the Ten Commandments and the corresponding effect of the display on
nonbelievers and various religious minorities. Noting "[t]he profoundly
sacred message embodied by the text" of the Ten Commandments, Justice
Stevens declared that the display "projects not just a religious, but an inher-
ently sectarian, message."l 56 Moreover, he argued:
Even if.. . the message of the monument, despite the inscribed text, fair-
ly could be said to represent the belief system of all Judeo-Christians, it
would still run afoul of the Establishment Clause by prescribing a com-
pelled code of conduct from one God, namely a Judeo-Christian God,
that is rejected by prominent polytheistic sects, such as Hinduism, as
well as nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism. And, at the very least,
the text of the Ten Commandments impermissibly commands a prefer-
ence for religion over irreligion.1 57
Reflecting upon increasingly diverse approaches to religion within
American society, Justice Stevens insisted that the Establishment Clause
demands careful attention to the perspectives of those who do not share the
message expressed by the display of the Ten Commandments:
Recognizing the diversity of religious and secular beliefs held by Texans
and by all Americans, it seems beyond peradventure that allowing the
seat of government to serve as a stage for the propagation of an unmis-
takably Judeo-Christian message of piety would have the tendency to
make nonmonotheists and nonbelievers "feel like [outsiders] in matters
of faith, and [strangers] in the political community. 158
Instead, according to Justice Stevens, the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Establishment Clause evolves along with the changes in the
religious makeup of the United States.159 Thus, he acknowledged that "the
requirement that government must remain neutral between religion and
irreligion would have seemed foreign to some of the Framers; so too would
a requirement of neutrality between Jews and Christians."' 60 However:
As religious pluralism has expanded, so has our acceptance of what con-
stitutes valid belief systems. The evil of discriminating today against
atheists, 'polytheists[,] and believers in unconcerned deities,' is in my
view a direct descendent of the evil of discriminating among Christian
sects. The Establishment Clause thus forbids it and, in turn, prohibits
Texas from displaying the Ten Commandments monument the plurality
so casually affirms. 161
156. Id. at 717.
157. Id. at 719 (citation omitted)
158. Id at 720.
159. Id at 734-35.
160. Id at 734.
161. Id. at 734-35 (citation omitted).
806 [Vol 87:3
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE THROUGH A RELIGIOUS PRISM
In short, he declared, "the Establishment Clause requires the same re-
spect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a Christian faith."1 62
The debates between the Justices in Van Orden carried over into its
companion case, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky.163 This time, the majority of the Court held that displays of the
Ten Commandments in courthouses violated the Establishment Clause.164
Justice Scalia dissented, expounding upon the themes he developed in Van
Orden. After once again casting serious doubt over the abiding viability of
Lemon v. Kurtzman, Justice Scalia labeled "demonstrably false" the majori-
ty's conclusion that " the government cannot favor religion over irreligion,"
and challenged the suggestion that "the posting of the Ten Commandments
violates the principle that the government cannot favor one religion over
another."l 65
In addition, Justice Scalia took the opportunity in his dissent in
McCreary to respond to Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Van Orden.
In a passage that exemplifies the divide that permeates the Justices' views
of the relevance of religious minority perspectives to the Establishment
Clause, Justice Scalia highlighted Justice Stevens' assertion that Justice
Scalia's position would "marginaliz[e] the belief systems of more than 7
million Americans who adhere to religions that are not monotheistic." 66 In
a stark expression of his willingness to allow the government to favor ma-
joritarian religious perspectives, Justice Scalia argued that
in the context of public acknowledgments of God there are legitimate
competing interests: On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not
feeling "excluded"; but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming
majority of religious believers in being able to give God thanks and sup-
plication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors. Our na-
tional tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority. 167
Finally, Justice O'Connor, once again noting the increasing religious
diversity in the United States, called for increasing attention to the per-
spectives of religious minorities:
It is true that many Americans find the Commandments in accord with
their personal beliefs. But we do not count heads before enforcing the
First Amendment. Nor can we accept the theory that Americans who do
not accept the Commandments' validity are outside the First Amend-
ment's protections.. . . It is true that the Framers lived at a time when
162. Id. at 711.
163. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
164. Id. at 881.
165. Id. at 893.
166. Id. at 899 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 719 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
167. Id at 900.
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our national religious diversity was neither as robust nor as well recog-
nized as it is now. They may not have foreseen the variety of religions
for which this Nation would eventually provide a home. They surely
could not have predicted new religions, some of them born in this coun-
try. But they did know that line-drawing between religions is an enter-
prise that, once begun, has no logical stopping point. They worried that
"the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects." The Religion Clauses, as a
result, protect adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in
no religion at all. 168
CONCLUSION
As Kent Greenawalt has observed, "since feelings of exclusion among
members of minorities are so important, and since the majority (Christians)
take cultural dominance so much for granted that they may not perceive
endorsement of their position, judges should attend especially to how rea-
sonable members of minorities may react."1 69 Reflecting on his own expe-
riences and perspectives, Greenawalt added that "[w]hen I was a child and
we gathered around a tree in our public school to sing Christmas carols, it
did not occur to me that this was anything other than natural." 70
Greenawalt's thoughtful reflections prove valuable in uncovering
some of the latent majoritarian religious perspectives that continue to char-
acterize the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Most
recently, in the 2010 case Salazar v. Buono, the Supreme Court decided
another case involving the meaning of a public religious symbol.171 This
time, the religious symbol was a Latin cross that was placed on public land
in the Mojave Desert to honor American soldiers who fell in World War
1.172
In his plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the cross is "cer-
tainly a Christian symbol," but he asserted that "the cross was not emplaced
on Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message ... ." 173 Instead, he found,
the cross was "intended simply to honor our Nation's fallen soldiers." 74 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Alito likewise acknowledged that "[t]he cross
168. Id at 884 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
169. Greenawalt, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 374.
170. Id. at 374 n.207.
171. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1816.
174. Id. at 1816-17.
808 [Vol 87:3
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THROUGH A RELIGIOUS PRISM
is of course the preeminent symbol of Christianity, and Easter services
have long been held on Sunrise Rock."175 Nevertheless, he concluded that
. . . the original reason for the placement of the cross was to commemo-
rate American war dead and, particularly for those with searing memo-
ries of The Great War, the symbol that was selected, a plain unadorned
white cross, no doubt evoked the unforgettable image of the white cross-
es, row on row, that marked the final resting places of so many American
soldiers who fell in that conflict. 176
Once again, however, other Justices expressed a very different under-
standing of the meaning of the cross. In a dissenting opinion joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, Justice Stevens responded:
I cannot agree that a bare cross such as this conveys a nonsectarian
meaning simply because crosses are often used to commemorate "heroic
acts, noble contributions, and patient striving" and to honor fallen sol-
diers. The cross is not a universal symbol of sacrifice. It is the symbol of
one particular sacrifice, and that sacrifice carries deeply significant
meaning for those who adhere to the Christian faith. The cross has some-
times been used, it is true, to represent the sacrifice of an individual, as
when it marks the grave of a fallen soldier or recognizes a state trooper
who perished in the line of duty. Even then, the cross carries a religious
meaning. But the use of the cross in such circumstances is linked to, and
shows respects for, the individual honoree's faith and beliefs. 177
As Justice Stevens reminds us, in current cases and for the foreseeable
future, different approaches to the relevance and significance of religious
perspectives, including those of religious minorities and nonbelievers, will
continue to play a central role in the interpretation and application of the
Establishment Clause.
175. Id. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 1822.
177. Id. at 1836 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1820 (majority opinion)).
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